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Much of the concern about immigration adversely affecting crime derives from the fact that 
immigrants tend to have characteristics in common with native born populations that are 
disproportionately incarcerated. This perception of a link between immigration and crime led to 
legislation in the 1990s increasing punishments toward criminal aliens. Despite the widespread 
perception of a link between immigration and crime, immigrants have much lower 
institutionalization (incarceration) rates than the native born. More recently arrived immigrants 
have the lowest comparative incarceration rates, and this difference increased from 1980 to 2000.  
We present a model of immigrant self-selection that suggests why, despite poor labor market 
outcomes, immigrants may have better incarceration outcomes than the native-born. We examine 
whether the improvement in immigrants’ relative incarceration rates over the last three decades 
is linked to increased deportation, immigrant self-selection, or deterrence. Our evidence suggests 
that deportation and deterrence of immigrants’ crime commission from the threat of deportation 
are not driving the results. Rather, immigrants appear to be self-selected to have low criminal 
propensities and this has increased over time. Why are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low?
Evidence on Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation
I. Introduction
Much of the concern about immigration adversely affecting crime derives from the fact 
that immigrants tend to have characteristics in common with native born populations that are 
disproportionately incarcerated: they have low average levels of education, very low average 
wages, and many are young, male, and Hispanic.  For similar reasons, there are general concerns 
about immigration adding to the “underclass” in the United States, and thus increasing 
dependence on government cash assistance, subsidized medical care, decreasing homeownership, 
and generally creating pockets of entrenched poverty with the adverse social outcomes that tends 
to imply.  During the 1990s, when immigration rates were high and crime rates were high and 
rising, observers posited a link between immigration and crime and several significant pieces of 
federal legislation were enacted to increase criminal penalties for noncitizens.  
Economic theories tend to support the concern about a link between immigration and 
crime.  The economic model of crime (Becker 1968 ), for example, posits that those who have 
poor labor market outcomes, and thus low opportunity costs from giving up activities in the legal 
sector, will be more likely to engage in criminal activity.  Many studies have documented 
immigrants’ poor labor market outcomes (see for example, Borjas (2004)), in part because of the 
low skills that many immigrants bring with them and in part because migration forces the loss of 
other elements of human capital (e.g., language, social networks) that enable individuals to make 
full use of their skills.  A unidimensional model of skills would lead one to expect that a 
population with poor labor market outcomes would also have poor outcomes in other arenas –
crime, health, family life, etc. – that society values.    2
In this paper, we examine immigrants’ institutionalization rates as a proxy for their 
incarceration and, thus, their involvement in criminal activity.  Contrary to what one might 
expect from the labor market studies, immigrants have very low rates of institutionalization 
compared to the native-born.  Their relative rates of institutionalization have fallen over the last 
three decades.  In addition, more recent cohorts have better criminal justice outcomes than earlier 
cohorts, and synthetic cohort analyses show that with time in the country, immigrants’ relative 
rates of institutionalization tend to decrease.  If one assumed that the “skills” people bring when 
they immigrate predict outcomes the same way as they do for natives, this is precisely the 
opposite of what one would predict from most synthetic cohort analyses of immigrants’ labor 
market outcomes.  After documenting immigrants’ low institutionalization rates, the cohort 
patterns in institutionalization, and how these have changed over time, we investigate potential 
reasons for these changes.  Are the much lower relative institutionalization rates of immigrants in 
2000 compared to 1990 due to changes in self-selection in immigration?  Did the changes in laws 
enacted in the 1990s that increased penalties for criminal noncitizens change out-migration 
patterns through increased deportation?  Or did these increasing penalties simply deter 
immigrants from committing crimes in the United States?
We present a variety of tests of these potential explanations.  We rule out deportation as 
an important factor for the observed differences in institutionalization.  Our investigation of 
enumeration practices also fails to explain the results.  Instead, the evidence suggests that there 
are multiple dimensions to who self-selects to immigrate to the United States.  Over the 1990s, 
those immigrants who chose to come to the United States were less likely to be involved in 
criminal activity than earlier immigrants and the native born.  3
II. Immigrant Self-Selection
The scholarly literature on immigration is much more voluminous with regard to wages 
and employment than it is with regard to criminal justice outcomes.  Borjas (2004) provides a 
thorough accounting of the experience of immigrants in the U.S. labor market.  Male immigrants 
have slightly lower employment rates, but wage rates that are substantially below those of the 
native born.  While in 1960 immigrants’ wages were 6.5% above those of natives, by 2000 they 
were 19% lower.  Those who arrived most recently have larger deficits:  in 1960 those who 
arrived recently earned 9% below natives, a gap that expanded to 38% in 1990.   In addition to, 
and because of, beginning at lower relative earnings, immigrant cohorts arriving after 1970 are 
not expected to fully assimilate to the higher native earnings rates.
Borjas (1987) provides a framework for understanding these changes in immigrants’ 
labor market outcomes over time.  He adapts a version of the Roy model (1951) to the problem 
of immigrant self-selection.  Suppose in each country, there is a distribution of skill that is 
transferable across country boundaries.  However, skill is translated into earnings in different 
ways in each country, and the distribution of earnings is more unequal in some countries than in 
others.  Thus, being low skilled may translate into a very different earnings level in one country 
than in another.  Immigrants will choose to move to a country if their earnings, given their skill 
set, will be higher than in their country of origin.
This model gives insight into the change in immigrants’ earnings in the U.S. over the last 
four decades.  As the sending countries changed from predominantly European countries to 
predominantly Latin American and Asian countries there was a shift in the skills of immigrants 
coming to the U.S. (because European countries tend to have earnings distributions that are more 
compressed than the United States, and Latin American countries tend to have distributions that 
are more dispersed).  Thus, the model predicts there would be a shift in the rank in the skill 4
distribution of those who immigrate to the U.S.  Those from Sweden, for example, who find their 
“offer” from the U.S. earnings distribution would be higher than the offer from their own 
country’s earnings distribution would tend to be of high skill.  On the other hand, immigrants 
from Mexico would tend to come from the lower end of the wage distribution, as those with high 
levels of skill would prefer the high wages from the relatively unequal wage distribution in 
Mexico. This model demonstrates why it might be that in recent years the United States drew 
immigrants who where predominantly low-skilled.
1
There is recent evidence on the issue of self-selection of Mexican immigrants. Chiquiar 
and Hanson (2005) examine the question of immigrant self-selection from Mexico using 
Mexican and U.S. Census data from 1990 and 2000.  Contrary to what one might expect from the 
Borjas-Roy model, they find that Mexican immigrants in the U.S. tend to be selected from the 
middle to upper part of the observable skill distribution compared to Mexicans who remain in 
Mexico.  Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2005), on the other hand, find that households that report 
having members who have emigrated to the U.S. tend to be selected from the lower part of the 
observable skill distribution.
2
The focus in the above papers is on selection along a dimension of observable skills. Our 
focus, on the other hand, is on unobservable attributes that determine criminal involvement and 
other social outcomes.  Perhaps migration decisions depend on returns in other sectors in 
addition to the labor market.  For example, perhaps people consider their returns to illegal 
                                               
1 It also suggests that as the U.S. wage distribution became more unequal, we should have seen a change 
in the skills of immigrants coming to the United States.  Interestingly, the most recent cohort in 2000 
appeared to have much higher relative wages than the most recent cohort in 1980 and 1990, a fact that can 
be attributed to engineers and computer scientists (Borjas and Friedberg 2004).
2 The difference between these likely arises because Ibarraran and Lubotsky’s methodology should pick 
up those individuals who are undercounted in the U.S. Census – young, low-skilled single men. We will 
address the undercount issue below.  In addition, Ibarraran and Lubotsky suggest that education among 
Mexican immigrants in the U.S. is likely to be misreported.5
activities as well.  This might cause those with high illegal earnings to remain in the source 
country rather than taking the risk of developing capacities in a new legal environment.  Or, 
perhaps the migration costs vary across individuals in ways that are correlated with success in 
multiple social domains (including criminality), as would be the case if social networks in the 
U.S. ease migration and those networks are more stable if the members are successful in one 
domain or another.
To see this, consider the Roy model presented in Borjas (1994) in which migration 
depends on an index that is a function of wages in the source and host country as well as 
migration costs:
(1) ) ( ) ( 0 1 0 1           I
where 1   is the mean log earnings (of immigrants) in the host country,  0   is the mean log 
earnings of immigrants in the source country,   is the cost of migration divided by the wage in 
the source country (which Borjas calls the “time cost” of migration), and  1   and  0  are the 
deviations in earnings in the two countries.  When I > 0, the individual migrates; when I < 0, the 
individual stays.  
Borjas analyzes the case where migration costs are constant in the population (and thus 
proportional to wages), but if migration costs vary with social networks (Chiquiar and Hanson 
2005 and Hanson forthcoming) or other factors related to success in the U.S., this reduces the 
cost of emigrating from the source country.  In this case, the Roy model implies that those with 
productive social networks will require a lower wage premium to reach the migration threshold.  
This model of selection implies that the correlation between wages and other outcomes at the 
country level may not be as strong as it is in individual-level data for the native born.   6
Finally, consider what happens when policy toward immigrants changes in the U.S., as 
happened in the 1990s when criminal penalties for noncitizens were dramatically increased and 
eligibility for welfare was reduced.  This would reduce the benefits to migration, as the index in 
(1) is now a function of these other attributes of the package associated with living in the U.S.:
(2)  ) , , , , , ( 0 0 1       f I 
where I is negatively related to  , the expected policy environment.  This deterrent effect will 
itself affect the migration decision, reinforcing other mechanisms that select immigrants with 
better social outcomes, including lower criminal propensities.
If immigrants with different social networks face different migration costs, then the 
process of migration may be one that peels apart different dimensions of skill and selection. 
Among immigrants, those with poor wage outcomes may nonetheless have relatively good social 
outcomes.  As a brief illustration, we show the relationship in the U.S. between mean real wages 
and three other outcomes (average institutionalization, welfare receipt, and labor force 
participation) for the 20 countries with the largest immigrant populations in the U.S.
3  In Figures 
1, 2, and 3, the line is a country-level linear regression weighted by the size of the immigrant 
population in the United States. We also plot the analogous information for the native-born in the 
U.S.  While the relationship between real wages and the other outcomes is negative for 
institutionalization and welfare receipt and positive for labor force participation, as predicted by 
a one dimensional model of skill, there is a great deal of variation. For instance, there are many 
countries whose people have very low wages in the United States, but also have very low rates of 
institutionalization and welfare receipt, and higher rates of labor force participation than 
expected given their wages.  Immigrants may have poor real wage outcomes, but relatively good 
                                               
3 The data are for men aged 18-40 in the 2000 Census. The data are described later in the text.  The top 
immigrant countries were selected based on the number of men in this age group in the 1990 Census.7
outcomes in one or another social domain, suggesting selection along more than one dimension 
of “skill.”
III. Immigrants’ Non-Labor Market Outcomes
The discussion above gives some insight into why comparisons of natives’ and 
immigrants’ labor market and non-labor market outcomes may give a different picture of how 
immigrants fare in the United States.  The literature on immigration has analyzed many 
outcomes, providing a broader picture of how immigration may affect the United States.  For 
example, research shows that immigrants are less likely to use welfare than similar natives 
(Butcher and Hu 2000).  Home ownership, often cited as an important feature in American 
society both as a stabilizing influence and a generator of wealth, also differs between immigrants 
and the native born.  Immigrants are less likely to own homes than the native born, and this gap 
widened between 1980 and 2000.  However, this gap is mainly driven by location choice and 
country of origin of immigrants.  Increases in immigrant enclaves in the future may be expected 
to generate increases in demand for owner-occupied housing (Borjas 2002).  Additional research 
has examined the participation of immigrants in mainstream financial institutions.  Use of banks 
and participation in financial markets may be important ways that individuals can improve their 
financial wellbeing.  If immigrants are reluctant to participate in these markets, then they may 
have more difficulty assimilating to U.S. standards of living over time.  Recent evidence 
suggests that immigrants are less likely to participate in financial markets, that these differences 
tend to persist, and may be driven by immigrants’ experience with financial institutions in their 
countries of origin (Osili and Paulson 2004a, b).  
Research on the crime outcomes of immigrants is limited (Mears 2002).  Immigrant 
males were much less likely to be institutionalized than native-born males in the United States in 8
1980 and 1990 and the lower observed institutionalization propensities of immigrants are 
particularly striking given the demographic characteristics well-known to be highly correlated 
with crime (such as education).  In addition, more recent immigrants have the lowest 
institutionalization rates of all immigrant cohorts, when analyzed relative to the experience of the 
native born (Butcher and Piehl 1998a).  This evidence is consistent with self-report data on 
criminal activity:  youth born abroad are statistically significantly less likely than native-born 
youth to report being criminally active (Butcher and Piehl 1998b).  
Taken together, this research gives a rich picture of how immigrants fare in the United 
States, how that has changed over time, and how immigrants are likely to affect the United 
States.  The literature reveals different patterns depending on the outcome considered.  In some 
cases, these outcomes are quite different from what one might expect given immigrants’ labor 
market outcomes. 
IV. Comparison of Immigrant and Native Born Institutionalization Rates across Three Decades
A. Descriptive Statistics
We use data from the 5% Public Use Microsamples of the U.S. Census in 1980, 1990, 
and 2000 to examine institutionalization rates for men ages 18-40.
4 Butcher and Piehl (1998b) 
shows that for this population, institutionalization closely approximates incarceration.
5
Descriptive statistics for native-born citizens and immigrants are reported in Table 1.
6    
                                               
4 We omit those born in outlying areas of the United States and those born abroad to U.S. citizens in order 
to simplify the analysis. 
5 The 1980 Census identifies the incarcerated among the institutionalized. For men aged 18-40, at least 
70% of the institutionalized are incarcerated. In addition, Butcher and Piehl (1998b) demonstrates that 
limiting the 1980 analysis to only those who are incarcerated does not substantively change the results. 
6 Throughout the paper we reported estimates using the person weight reported by the Census (there are 
no weights in 1980). 9
The educational distributions are very different for immigrants and the native born.  In 
1980, the proportions with some college and with a college degree were quite similar across the 
two groups, while among immigrants the proportion without a high school degree was nearly 
twice that of natives.  The educational distribution for immigrants is essentially unchanged over 
the past twenty years.  Over this same period, the native born have greatly increased their 
education – in 2000 only 12% had less than a high school degree and there was a 50% increase 
in the number with some college education.  By the end of the period under study, immigrants 
were nearly three times as likely as the native born to have less than a high school education.  
The fraction immigrant in the sample nearly tripled over this period – from approximately 6% to 
about 17% -- and it is perhaps remarkable that the populations are not even more different.
As has been well-documented elsewhere, the racial and ethnic distributions for 
immigrants and natives are quite different, and changing over time.  Immigrants are much less 
likely than natives to be white, non-Hispanic and much more likely be Asian and Hispanic.  
These differences have grown in magnitude over time, with nearly 60% of immigrants in 2000 
reporting their ethnicity as Hispanic and over 20% defining their race as Asian or Pacific 
Islander.
In our analyses of immigrants over time, we categorize immigrants by their year of 
arrival in the United States, generally grouping into five-year cohorts.  These cohorts vary by 
size both because of immigration and emigration patterns and also due to the age restriction on 
the sample.  Recent cohorts contain tens of thousands of members, while the earliest cohorts 
available in any given Census contain about a thousand members, all at the oldest ages in the 
sample.  For our analyses we emphasize those who arrived in the U.S. more recently both 
because of their relevance to policy discussions and for statistical precision.10
In these data, “immigrant” is equivalent to “foreign born.” In many contexts, legal 
distinctions are made between the foreign born who intend to become permanent residents, and 
those who are more transient. For example, permanent resident aliens typically have the right to 
work in the U.S., while those on a student visa do not.  However, the important distinction in 
terms of the legal treatment of criminal aliens is made between immigrants who have naturalized 
and those who have not, since the latter are subject to deportation.  Thus, it is important to pay 
attention to how citizenship status has changed over time for our subsequent analyses of 
institutionalization rates. 
Overall about 30% of immigrants are naturalized citizens of the United States, and this 
number fell somewhat over the past twenty years.  The bottom of Table 1 shows that the rate of 
citizenship is strongly related to when immigrants arrived.  In 1980, for example, 80% of those 
who had arrived before 1960 were naturalized.  Because of this relationship and because 
citizenship determines key dimensions of criminal punishment, this variable will be of particular 
interest in the analyses to come.  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics about institutionalization for immigrants and the 
native born.  The first row reports the proportion in an institution on the day of the census, a 
number that has risen from 1.3% of the population of young men in 1980 to 3% in 2000.  When 
this population statistic is disaggregated, tremendous variation is revealed.  For example, 
immigrants have substantially lower institutionalization rates, and this ranking holds for all racial 
and ethnic groups.  Immigrants had an institutionalization rate 30% that of natives in 1980, 49% 
in 1990, and 20% in 2000.  In 1980 immigrants who were citizens had a higher 
institutionalization rate than those who were not, but in 1990 and 2000 the situation was 
reversed.  There are several potential explanations for this shift, some having to do with 11
incentives for citizenship and others having to do with the detention and deportation of 
noncitizens.  We explore these explanations later in the paper.
The middle part of the table shows the variation in institutionalization rates with 
education and race/ethnicity.  While the rates for immigrants are in all cases much lower than for 
natives, the strong correlation with education is observed in both groups.  The cross-racial group 
pattern too shows the same features for both groups.
The bottom part of Table 2 shows that more recent immigrants have lower 
institutionalization rates than immigrants who arrived earlier.  This pattern is consistent with the 
idea that immigrants are positively selected on the crime commission dimension and assimilate 
toward the higher native rate with time in the country.  We will examine evidence on this point 
in greater detail later in the paper.
Figure 4 shows the fraction immigrant inside and outside of institutions in each Census. 
Although the fraction immigrant in the nation as a whole increased dramatically between each of 
these Censuses, the fraction immigrant in institutions actually fell from 1990 to 2000.  In the 
most recent Census, nearly four percent of young men in institutions were immigrant while 17 
percent of the general population (of young men) was immigrant.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between age and institutionalization for the native born 
and for the most recent immigrants for each of the three Census years.  For the native-born 
Americans, the age-institutionalization curve peaks in the early twenties and gradually falls off in 
a pattern well-known to criminologists.  The institutionalization rates increased each decade for 
each age group.  The most dramatic feature of the graph is the relatively low rates for recent 
immigrants.  One possible explanation for the low rates is that it takes several years of exposure 
to the U.S. criminal justice system before one is likely to be institutionalized and recent 
immigrants have not accumulated enough experience (either to begin criminal enterprises, to be 12
caught by law enforcement, or to have cases processed through the system).  This may also be 
behind the relatively linear relationship between age and institutionalization among immigrants.
Setting aside this “exposure time” hypothesis (which we explore in a subsequent section), 
there are several other features to note.  Recent immigrants have not had increases in 
institutionalization comparable to natives and, in fact, it appears that the line for 2000 is shifted 
down from 1990.  The estimates bounce around somewhat and no big changes appear in the 
basic shape of the relationship between age and institutionalization.
Although immigrants have lower institutionalization rates than natives, they share 
characteristics with native-born Americans who have high institutionalization rates.  These 
characteristics include education and race, but also age, as immigrants are under-represented 
(relative to natives) in the youngest ages in this analysis (ages 18-21), when native 
institutionalization rates are lowest.  Figure 6 reports the institutionalization rates we expect to 
see among various groups of immigrants based on the institutionalization propensities of the 
native born.
7  This exercise reveals just how low the observed rates are, considering the lower 
educational attainment and other characteristics of immigrants. 
Simply predicting institutionalization for immigrants based on their ages and the native-
born institutionalization propensities in 1980 gives an average predicted institutionalization rate 
of 0.013 for immigrants, up from their observed rate of 0.004 and equal to the rate of the native 
born.  The effect for 1990 and 2000 is similar:  predictions based on age-institutionalization 
relationship give immigrants institutionalization rates similar to those of natives.  Thus, the 
simple comparison of means in Table 2 shows that institutionalization of immigrants is greatly 
                                               
7 These calculations come from running logits on a sample of the native born only and then using the 
estimated coefficients to predict institutionalization for immigrants.13
affected by the ages under consideration.  Predicted institutionalization rates for citizen and 
noncitizen immigrants (not shown) based on age and are very similar.  
The second bar in Figure 6 for each year represents predictions based on age, education, 
race, and ethnicity.  This model predicts and institutionalization rate for immigrants of 0.073, ten 
times the observed rate in the data.  Furthermore, for this specification, in all years the predicted 
institutionalization rate is about 50% higher for noncitizens than it is for citizens (not shown).  
Clearly, immigrants have characteristics that in the native born population are highly correlated 
with institutionalization.  
B. Data Considerations and Corroborating Evidence
The basic result from the tables and figures described above is that immigrants, despite 
having characteristics that in the native population are highly correlated with institutionalization, 
have very low institutionalization rates, and their institutionalization rates relative to the native 
born fell between 1990 and 2000.  In this section, we discuss whether these results can be 
reliably used to estimate how institutionalization and criminal propensities changed over time.
i. Enumeration Issues
These institutionalization rates are measures of the number of individuals in institutions 
divided by the number of individuals overall. Mismeasurement of either the numerator or the 
denominator would result in poor estimates of institutionalization rates.
a. The Numerator
In our context we are concerned with whether the total number of institutionalized 
individuals are counted correctly, and particularly concerned that any mismeasurement does not 
differ systematically between the native-born and immigrant populations.  For our detailed 
analysis of changes over time (below) we are also concerned with whether mismeasurement in 
the institutionalized population changes over time.14
The institutionalized population is a subset of the “special populations” category in the 
U.S. Census. The Census has separate questionnaires and procedures for those housed in group 
quarters, including institutions. Many of those living in institutions, including prisons and jails, 
are deemed unable to fill out their own questionnaires. Thus, Census enumerators fill out these 
forms over several weeks using administrative data.  (See the data appendix for a more detailed 
description of Census enumeration procedures in special populations.) Thus, the Census records 
for the incarcerated population should be as good as the administrative data on which they are 
based.
There very large incentives for the administrators of prisons and jails to accurately count 
their inmates. Thus, we would expect this population to be accurately counted relative to the rest 
of the population.  
The next question is whether there are systematic differences in the counting of 
immigrants and the native born, and whether the differences in counting changed over time. 
While it is plausible that not all the foreign born are properly identified, there are incentives for 
criminal justice administrators to identify the foreign born, particularly those who are not 
citizens. The incentives to identify noncitizen aliens increased over this time period. Thus, if 
anything, we would expect any undercount of institutionalized immigrants to decrease relative to 
the native born over the time period.  These changes in mismeasurement would be expected to 
increase the measured institutionalization rate of immigrants relative to the native born.   
b. The Denominator
A second source of mismeasurement comes from the undercount of the overall 
population. The “undercount” arises when the Census does not enumerate some individuals, and 
this is thought to be more likely in certain populations, particularly those that are more likely to 
be transient. The 2000 Census is widely reputed to have improved the undercount problem 15
relative to the 1990 Census. In our case then, if the denominator in the calculation of 
institutionalization rates got larger, not because the population actually grew, but because more 
of the individuals who were here were enumerated, then we would find a spurious decrease in 
the institutionalization rate between 1990 and 2000.  Again, we are not necessarily concerned if 
the undercount improved for all populations in the same way, but if immigrants are more likely 
to be undercounted than the general population and the undercount improved for them then we 
could find a spurious decrease in the relative institutionalization rates of immigrants to the native 
born.
The data appendix provides more details on the potential impact of changes in the 
undercount on our estimates of immigrant institutionalization rates in 1990 and 2000. Our 
simulations demonstrate that it is unlikely our estimates are purely driven by changes in the 
undercount.  Suppose that the institutionalization rate for immigrants in 1990 and 2000 were 
actually the same. In order for changes in the undercount to generate the estimates of 
institutionalization in Table 2, the relative undercount of immigrants to the native born would 
have to be 37:1 (e.g., the Census missed 37 immigrants for every 1 missed native).    
ii. Incarceration and its relationship to Crime Commission
A second important question is whether we can use the information on institutionalization 
rates to make inferences about immigrants’ commission of crime in the United States. If Census 
measures of institutionalization were poor measures of the true incarceration rates, then these 
measures would not tell us much about how immigration affects public safety.  Alternatively, if 
immigrants are less likely than the native born to be caught for a given criminal act, then the 
institutionalization rates may change without crime rates being affected.
We can use information on Metropolitan Area (MA) crime rates and immigrant density to 
provide some corroborating evidence on the relationship between immigration and crime.  Figure 16
7 shows the change in MA crime rates graphed against the change in fraction immigrant for 1990 
to 2000 for the 24 largest MAs (with reliable data).  Here we see that those areas that had the 
largest increases in their fraction immigrant had the largest decreases in their crime rates. This 
confirms earlier results in Butcher and Piehl (1998a) that presents a thorough analysis of changes 
in metropolitan crime rates and immigration patterns between 1980 and 1990. This analysis at 
the Metropolitan Area level also confirms the results from the individual level Census data 
reported here: immigrants’ criminality improved relative to the native born between 1990 and 
2000. 
V. Institutionalization by Immigrant Cohort
Table 3a reports the marginal effects, evaluated at the sample mean, for logit models for 
institutionalization in the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses.  Here we examine the differences in 
institutionalization rates for different cohorts of immigrants, controlling for differences in 
characteristics.  The first column shows the overall difference in institutionalization for 
immigrants and the native born, controlling for a full set of age indicators.  In 1980, immigrant 
institutionalization rates are about one percentage point below natives; in 1990, they are a little 
more than one percentage point lower; and in 2000, they are nearly three percentage points 
lower.
Columns 2-5 in Table 3a break out the differences between institutionalization rates for 
immigrants and the native born by cohort. Column 2 controls only for the age distribution.  
Column 3 includes controls for education.
8  Column 4 adds controls for race and ethnicity.
9
                                               
8 College degree and above is the omitted category.
9 White non-Hispanic is the omitted category.17
Finally, column 5 includes controls for whether or not the individual is a U.S. citizen.  This 
variable is equal to one for the native born and for naturalized immigrants.
We can see several patterns in the estimated effects of immigrant cohorts in each of the 
three samples.  First, nearly all the estimated effects for immigrant cohorts are negative.  No 
matter in which year immigrants came to the U.S., they are less likely to be institutionalized than 
are the native born with similar characteristics.
Second, although the estimated cohort effects are negative, there are larger negative 
effects for more recent cohorts.  More recent immigrants in each of the three Census samples are 
relatively less likely to be institutionalized, compared to immigrants who arrived earlier.  With a 
few exceptions, relative institutionalization rates rise as we move from more recent to earlier 
cohorts, regardless of the control variables included.
The cohort pattern in these estimates is open to several interpretations (see, for example, 
Borjas 1985).  Immigrants who have been in the country for longer periods of time may be 
“assimilating” toward the higher institutionalization rates of the native-born.  This could come 
through two effects.  Immigrants may be increasing their participation in criminal activities with 
time in the country, or, they may have had more chances to get caught for a given level of 
criminal activity.  The first of these would suggest that immigrants are changing their criminal 
activity as they learn more about opportunities in the illegal sector.  The second we refer to as the 
“exposure time” hypothesis: it may take a while before an individual has a serious enough 
offense record to receive an incarcerative punishment.  Alternatively, the people who came to the 
U.S. between 1970 and 1974 may be very different from the people who came between 1980 and 
1985, for example.  There are several mechanisms by which such shifts could occur, including 
selective immigration.18
If immigrants who came to the United States in different waves of immigration were 
identical in all respects, and institutionalization rates overall were stable over time, then within a 
Census sample, we could use earlier immigrants’ institutionalization rates as a predictor of the 
eventual institutionalization rates of later immigrants.  We refer to this estimate as the “within 
Census” prediction.  On the other hand, since we have several Census samples, we can examine 
how the institutionalization rates for a given cohort change over time across Census samples.  
We refer to this estimate as the “between-Census” prediction. 
Table 3b calculates the within- and between-Census estimates of changes in 
institutionalization for a number of immigrant cohorts.
10  If there had been no change in overall 
institutionalization probabilities and no change in immigrant institutionalization propensities 
over time, we would expect the within and between Census estimates to yield similar results.  
Here we see that they are quite different.  In all three years, the within-Census estimates are 
positive, implying that we should expect immigrant institutionalization rates to rise relative to the 
native born with time in the country.  
In contrast, following a given cohort across Census years generally shows the opposite 
result.  Between 1980 and 1990, the 1975-1979 and 1970-1974 cohorts decreased their relative 
institutionalization rates once education is included in the controls.  Between 1990 and 2000, all 
of the cohorts examined decreased their relative institutionalization rates, regardless of which 
controls are included.  These estimates suggest, for example, between a 0.36 to a 0.86 percentage 
point decline in relative institutionalization for the 1985-1990 and 1980-1984 cohorts between 
1990 and 2000 while the within estimates suggest that relative institutionalization rates should 
have increased by 0.1 to 0.5 percentage points.  
                                               
10 Standard errors are calculated as for the difference between two independent means.19
These results strongly suggest that something changed across these decades.  We will 
spend the remainder of the paper weighing the evidence for what that something might be.  
Before we do that, however, it is worth examining how relative institutionalization rates changed 
for the most recent two cohorts in each Census year.  Table 3c computes the relative 
institutionalization rates for the two most recent cohorts for the three combinations of Censuses. 
This comparison holds constant exposure to the criminal justice system, as discussed above, and 
also limits the bias resulting from any return migration.
11  Each of the cohorts had been in the 
country for less than five or between five and ten years.  In every case, the recent arrivals have 
lower relative institutionalization rates in the later Census years.  Once again, this suggests that 
immigrants who have arrived in the U.S. in the last two decades are less prone to criminal acts 
than previous immigrants, or that something else has changed.  And once again, these effects are 
large, especially in 2000.  
Lubotsky (2000) points out that the Census may misclassify immigrants as recent arrivals 
who are actually re-entrants.
12  Indeed, he finds that many of the studies focusing on immigrant 
wage assimilation overstate the secular decline in the level of earnings across immigrant cohort 
due to the misclassification of these mostly low-wage multiple entrants as “recent immigrants.”  
It is less clear how this misclassification may affect our results.  If some in the “recent 
                                               
11 One of the potential problems with both the within and between comparisons is that cohorts that have 
been in the U.S. for longer periods of time may have changed their composition significantly from when 
they arrived. For example, suppose that those immigrants who fared worst in the U.S. were those most 
likely to return to their country of origin. Both the within and between comparisons could be affected by 
this selection process (although presumably they would be affected in the same direction, so this is not an 
explanation for why the within and between above are of opposite sign). 
12 Another source of misclassification may come from the allocation codes.  If immigrants are more likely 
to be allocated incorrect data than the native born, then that might affect our results.  There is evidence 
that immigrants are more likely to have allocated education data than are the native born, for example 
(Ibarraran and Lubotsky 2005). In our case, the problem would be most serious if immigration or 
institutionalization status were disproportionately misallocated.  However, very few observations have 
allocated data for the key pieces of information in this study. 20
immigrant” category are these re-entrants with very low skills, then we might expect, as a 
corollary to the wage studies, to find this group relatively more likely to be incarcerated.  On the 
other hand, the fact that they are re-entrants may suggest a certain fluidity of movement that 
allows them to escape detection, and thus to have lower institutionalization rates for a given level 
of criminal activity. 
Before turning to a discussion of the potential explanations for our estimates, we examine 
how sensitive our results are to the choice of where to evaluate the marginal effects.  Appendix 
Tables 1a and 1b present estimates analogous to those in Tables 3b and 3c evaluated at a 
constant set of characteristics.  Immigrant and native-born characteristics change across the 
decades in uneven ways.  In addition, the non-linear nature of the logit means that the marginal 
effects may differ depending on where they are calculated.  Here we have chosen to evaluate the 
marginal effects for a 25-year old Hispanic with a high school degree.  The estimates are 
qualitatively similar to those in Tables 3b and 3c – namely the within-Census estimates predict 
an increase in institutionalization while the between-Census estimates and the estimates holding 
constant exposure time show a decrease.  However, the between-Census estimates of the relative 
decline in institutionalization are much larger here – from 1.5 to 6 percentage points, depending 
on the specification.
Next we consider the potential role of age-at-arrival. As pointed out by Friedberg (1992)
age-at-arrival will vary systematically across cohorts, especially when the data are limited to a 
restrictive set of ages. Those who arrived earlier, must have arrived at an earlier age in order to 
still be under 40 years old and be in our sample. It is likely that those who arrive at earlier ages 
have a greater potential to assimilate to U.S. norms than those who arrive at older ages. If there 
are systematic changes in age-at-arrival across Censuses, that could affect our cohort patterns. 
Thus, Appendix Tables 2a and 2b contain a final robustness check on our main results.  Here we 21
restrict the sample to those immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as children (younger than age 
13).  This serves to test whether our earlier results were driven by the changing age distribution 
within cohort.  Comparing the results in these tables to those in Tables 3b and 3c we find quite 
comparable findings, in magnitude as well as sign.  Thus we conclude that changing age at 
arrival is not an important driver of our finding that immigrants have improved relative to the 
native born over time.
VI. Deportation, Selection and Deterrence
Clearly immigrants are less likely to be institutionalized than the native born, and this 
difference is larger in 2000 than in earlier years. Further, the immigrants appear to improve 
relative to natives with time in the country, and this improvement is greater from 1990 to 2000 
than it was from 1980 to 1990. There are several potential explanations for the time patterns in 
relative institutionalization rates discussed above. Changes in policies toward criminal aliens in 
the 1990s may have increased deportation, reducing the population of institutionalized 
immigrants relative to other immigrants and the native born. Alternatively, changes in the legal 
environment and the economic environment in the United States may have changed the types of 
immigrants who self-select to immigrate and to return to their countries of origin.  Or, selection 
of the types of immigrants who come to the U.S. may have remained stable, but the increased 
criminal penalties may have had a deterrent effect, changing their behavior once here. 
If institutionalization mapped directly to underlying criminal behavior in the same way 
for all immigrant cohorts and for the native born, differences between institutionalization rates 
for immigrants and the native born could be interpreted as differences in criminality, and we 
could directly infer immigrants’ criminality.  There are several reasons to worry that criminality 
does not map to institutionalization in the same way for all immigrant cohorts and the native 22
born.  In particular, immigrants who are not citizens and who have committed crimes may be 
subject to deportation (for details see Legomsky 1999).   Deportation may be thought of as a 
special case of “out-migration.”  Lubotsky (2000) notes that selective out-migration of less 
successful immigrants in the labor market may have overstated immigrant earnings growth with 
time in the country.  If immigrants who are less successful in the labor market are more likely, all 
else equal, to commit crimes and more likely to emigrate (such that they emigrate prior to 
committing those crimes), then both our within and between estimates of changes in 
institutionalization rates will lead us to infer too little criminality among immigrants (but will be 
accurate as to the commission of crime in the U.S.). 
The implications of deportation, as opposed to self-selected out-migration, for 
institutionalization rates are somewhat more complicated as they depend on the speed with 
which immigrants are removed from the country.  Immigrants who have committed crimes 
generally are required to serve their sentences before being removed.  So, deportation does not 
reduce institutionalization for the current offense, but may reduce institutionalization because 
removed immigrants are no longer in the U.S. to be institutionalized for subsequent violations.  
This effect would serve to reduce immigrant institutionalization rates relative to the native born.  
On the other hand, if immigrant removal is slow, perhaps because of backlogs in the system, 
immigrants may serve longer for a given sentence than do the native born, as was shown in 
Butcher and Piehl (2000).  This would tend to inflate immigrant institutionalization rates relative 
to the native born.  
In addition, if the probability that an immigrant is deported is changing over time, then 
deportation will also affect the comparisons of relative immigrant-native born institutionalization 
rates over time.  The Violent Crime Law of 1994 and then the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 expanded the list of crimes for which noncitizen immigrants can be 23
deported.  Thus, one might expect that increased deportation over the 1990s would bias our 
estimates toward finding lower institutionalization rates among immigrants.  
There are few definitive estimates in the literature of these key parameters.  Noncitizens 
may also be institutionalized while awaiting deportation, or while the process for deportation 
evolves (included waiting for hearings).  Legomsky (1999) reports that following the 1996 Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, “mandatory detention now applies to almost all 
noncitizens who are inadmissible or deportable on crime-related grounds – not just to those 
convicted of aggravated felonies (p.532).”  Thus there are several reasons that noncitizens may 
have higher probabilities than natives of being observed in an institutional setting.
13  
The INS has been surprisingly ineffective at removing criminal aliens.  Shuck and 
Williams (1999) note that there is tremendous political support for removing criminal aliens, and 
large fiscal incentives for doing so.  Nonetheless, their best estimate is that the INS has removed 
“fewer than twenty percent of the nearly 300,000 criminal aliens estimated to be already under 
law enforcement supervision.”  In their assessment of the political economy around the removal 
of criminal aliens, Shuck and Williams find that the federal government focused on procedural 
reforms rather than identifying criminal aliens and information management, which should have 
been first order concerns.  They attribute the policy failure to a misalignment of incentives 
between federal and state (and local) agencies.  A recent New York Times investigation reported
that city sanctuary policies, such as the one in Los Angeles that prohibits police from inquiring 
about immigration status unless there is a formal charge of a crime, mean that those who have 
been deported can frequently return to the United States and resume their lives (LeDuff 2005).  
Regardless of the reasons behind the implementation problems, the existence of these 
                                               
13 Of course there are other factors at work.  Immigrants may be less likely to report crimes, so 
perpetrators of these crimes may have lower rates of detection (see Butcher and Piehl 1998a for some 
discussion).  Also, bail decisions may be influenced by citizenship status.24
inefficiencies is central to interpretation of the results of any analysis of criminal justice 
outcomes for immigrants. 
Indeed, the numbers of immigrants deported (both voluntary departures and formal 
removals) increased over the three decades we examine. From 1971 to 1980, about 7.5 million 
immigrants were expelled;
14 from 1981 to 1990, about 10.2 million immigrants were expelled; 
and from 1991 to 2000, about 14.5 million immigrants were expelled.
15  Among those deported, 
not simply excluded, the most common administrative reasons given during the 1990s were 
“attempted entry without proper documents” (35%) and “criminal activity” (31%).
16  It is 
difficult to use these aggregate numbers to gain traction for the issue at hand:  the extent of the 
bias in our estimates across synthetic cohorts. So for now we turn to a different approach to 
checking for the robustness of the estimates reported earlier:  restricting our attention to U.S. 
citizens, for whom detention and deportation are not relevant considerations.  In addition, 
immigrants who have become citizens are less likely to emigrate, so this should also mitigate 
problems due to selective voluntary out-migration.
Before we report on our analyses for citizens only, we consider the possibility of changes 
in the nature of citizenship over time.  In addition to increasing the list of criminal offenses for 
which one could be deported if one was not a citizen, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act made this change in law retroactive.  That is, if a noncitizen had committed one of 
these deportable offenses before the law was enacted, he or she was now subject to deportation.  
Thus, this law increased the punishment associated with a particular conviction for non-
                                               
14 Fiscal Year 2002 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statitstics/ENF2002list.htm
15 The vast majority of these expulsions are voluntary departures. For example, from 1991-2000, only 
939,749 of the expulsions were formal removals.
16 The INS Immigration Statistics Reports 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ENF2002tables.pdf.25
naturalized immigrants relative to citizens.  One might expect this to have two effects.  First, it 
might act as a deterrent such that noncitizens, knowing they could be subject to banishment in 
addition to a term of incarceration, are now less likely to commit crimes than they were in the 
past.  Secondly, it might have given immigrants an incentive to become naturalized citizens.
Indeed, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
better known as “welfare reform,” may also have given immigrants an incentive to become 
citizens. As originally passed, the welfare reform bill barred non-naturalized immigrants from 
receipt of most forms of welfare; as revised, only immigrants who arrived after the law are 
subject to the ban.
17  Anecdotes at the time suggested that immigrants were lining up to apply for 
citizenship as the atmosphere in the mid-1990s gave immigrants new incentives to naturalize.
Table 4 reports our inquiry into changes in citizenship status by immigrant cohort across 
the three Censuses.  Here, we estimate a logit for citizenship among immigrants only.  We 
evaluated the marginal effects at the sample means.  As in table 3a, we control for a full set of 
age dummies in all regressions; the second set of results adds controls for education; the third set 
adds controls for race and ethnicity.  In this case, the omitted category is the most recent cohort 
in each Census year, so the baseline varies across samples.  The first column for each year shows 
the raw statistic for fraction citizen for each of the cohorts.
Table 4 shows the extent to which different immigrant cohorts “take up” citizenship over 
this time period.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, those who have just arrived have low rates of 
citizenship – under 10% -- and those who have been in the country over 20 years hover around 
70%.   This general pattern is relatively stable over time.  Note that the estimates in Table 4 are 
relative to the most recent arrival cohort, which in 2000 has the lowest citizenship rates of all 
                                               
17 States had the option to use state funds to extend benefits to immigrants left out of the federal statute. 
Many, especially many with large immigrant populations chose to do so.26
cohorts in all years.  These results give us no reason to believe that immigrants in great numbers 
sought protection from the increased penalties for criminal activity by naturalizing as citizens.   
Fix et al. (2003) reports that those immigrants with the least English language proficiency, those 
with lower education, and those with lower incomes are less likely to become naturalized 
citizens.  The direction of these correlations is the opposite direction implied by the hypothesis 
that, over time, criminally active immigrants increased their citizenship propensity. 
We use the sample of citizens (native born and naturalized) to examine how 
institutionalization patterns changed over time for immigrants who are not subject to the 
increased threat of deportation due to legislation enacted in the 1990s. Tables 5a and 5b show 
that restricting our attention to citizens, immigrant and native, does not appreciably alter our 
conclusions from Tables 3b and 3c.  Here we do see some negative within-Census predictions, 
but in all cases the between-Census predictions are larger in absolute value.  Among citizens, 
immigrants are much less likely than natives to be institutionalized, and the magnitude of the 
difference with the native born has grown substantially over time.  The fact that citizens continue 
to show the same patterns, even when the incentive for criminally active immigrants to become 
citizens increased, substantially moderates concerns that the estimation strategy is biased in favor 
immigrants due to deportation of criminal immigrants. It also suggests that the shift is not due to 
a deterrent effect from the threat of deportation, since citizens are not subject to deportation. 
Next, we consider whether immigrants may be self-selected from among those with 
lower criminal propensities.  If individuals who move are positively selected in some regard 
compared to those who stay put near where they were born,
18 then this may explain the better 
                                               
18 Butcher (1994) compares labor market outcomes for immigrant and native-born blacks and finds that 
immigrant blacks have better labor market outcomes than the native born. However, when the native born 
who have moved from their state of birth are used as the comparison group, outcomes are very similar. 
Suggesting that movers, whether native born or immigrant, are similar. 27
outcomes of immigrants with regard to criminal justice outcomes.  To partially control for this 
unobserved quality, we compare immigrants to natives who have moved from their state of birth, 
rather than to the whole native-born population.
19  We recognize that this is a partial control for 
what it takes to immigrate across national boundaries, likely requiring living in a new culture 
with a new language.  But we hope it goes some way to controlling for this important form of 
selection.
Tables 6a and 6b report the results of this exercise.  Here we find that selection matters a 
great deal to the estimates for various immigrant cohorts.  The between-Census estimates are 
about one-third to one-half the magnitude when the comparison group is native movers rather 
than all natives.  In fact, some of the between census estimates come very close to zero when 
controls for education are included.  (Note that among natives, education is positively correlated 
with the likelihood of residing outside one’s home state.)  Holding exposure time constant in 
Table 6b, we similarly find that recently arrived immigrants have lower institutionalization rates 
than native-born movers. However, in contrast to results in Table 3c, the results for 2000-1990 
compared to 1990-1980 do not show that the recently arrived in the later time period have lower 
relative institutionalization rates. Now the results are more similar across the decades, suggesting 
that native-born movers and immigrants responded to increased penalties for criminal activity in 
similar ways.  These results suggest that migration, whether across national or state boundaries, 
tends to select individuals with lower criminal propensities.  
                                               
19 This measure is somewhat problematic since one reason a person may live outside his state of birth is if 
he is sent to a federal prison in another state. This would tend to increase the institutionalization rates of 
native born movers. This bias is likely to be small, however, as federal prisoners are a small fraction of all 
prisoners.28
VII. Conclusion
The institutionalization experience of immigrants raises questions that have bearing on 
our basic understandings of criminal behavior, immigrant selection and assimilation, and, by 
extension, public policies related to crime and to immigration.  We have shown that immigrants 
have substantially lower institutionalization than natives, and that this differential has grown 
over the time period that institutionalization expanded.  In 2000, male young adult immigrants 
are institutionalized at one-fifth the rate of comparable native-born Americans.  Although 
immigrants continue to be much more likely than natives to have low levels of education, this 
has not caused institutionalization rates to rise.  In fact, when we predict the institutionalization 
rate for immigrants based on the experiences of natives, we find that the observed rate is one-
tenth of the predicted one.
Analyses across immigrant cohorts suggest that more recent immigrant cohorts have 
lower institutionalization rates than earlier cohorts. Further, immigrants reduce their relative 
incarceration rates with time in the country.  The fact that our results for immigrant citizens are 
similar to those for immigrants overall, convince us that increased deportation of criminal aliens 
in the 1990s is not driving these findings.   In addition, one might expect a dramatic increase in
the rate at which citizenship is taken up if crime-prone immigrants were taking up citizenship as 
protection against deportation. We do not observe such a shift.  We do, however, find that 
immigrants do not look nearly as good when evaluated relative to natives who move.  We read 
this as evidence that both internal and international migrants are self-selected from among those 
with lower criminal propensities.  Together, this evidence suggests that selection of immigrants 
occurs over more than one dimension of skill.    29
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Data Appendix
There are two potential problems with Census data that could affect our results.  The first 
is the “undercount” – the problem of failing to enumerate individuals, typically thought to be 
more serious in poor and minority communities. The second potential problem has to do with 
how special populations, such as those in institutions are counted by the Census. For example, if 
a high fraction of those under correctional supervision are in transition (being transferred from 
one place to another) they may be missed in the population count.  Thus, it is worth 
understanding how Census collects data for special populations.
1)  Data Collection in Special Populations
Data collection in special populations, like the institutionalized population, may present 
particular challenges. For example, many of those in institutions may not be able to or may be 
unwilling to fill out Census forms.  Additionally, in the case of prisoners, for example, people 
may frequently be moved between institutions, creating a difficulty in counting them on Census 
day.
There is a different Census form for those living in group quarters, and additional forms 
for those in military quarters and on-board ships.  As mentioned in the data section, among those 
living in group quarters, some types of group quarters are designated as “institutions.” Jails and 
prisons fall into this category, and although they are not separately identifiable in the PUMS 
data, by limiting our sample to men aged 18-40, a very high fraction of the institutionalized 
populations is in correctional facilities (based on comparisons to the 1980 Census where type of 
institution is identifiable).33
In the 2000 Census, about half of those living in group quarters were unable to fill out 
Census forms.
20 A disproportionate share of those unable to fill out their own Census forms is in 
an institution (jail, prison, mental institution, for example). In this case, Census enumerators fill 
out the forms using the institutions’ administrative records.  
The enumeration procedure for group quarters takes place over several weeks. The 
Census enumerators ask where an inmate was on April 1. For those inmates who are in transit on 
April 1, if they reach their final destination on that day, then they are counted at the final 
destination. If they are in transit, then they are counted at their originating location. 
Under these circumstances then, the institutionalized population is likely to be well-counted, 
since the institutions themselves are likely to keep accurate administrative records that document 
the number of inmates.  Thus, the “undercount” of the institutionalized population is likely much 
less severe than of the overall population.  In addition, the demographic information on inmates 
of correctional institutions is likely to be about as good as the administrative records themselves. 
Since there was more pressure and more incentive for correctional institutions to identify (non-
naturalized) immigrants in their inmate populations in 2000 than in 1990, we would expect that a 
higher fraction of immigrants would be identified in 2000 than in 1990. Thus, any “undercount” 
of institutionalized immigrants would be likely higher in 1990 than in 2000.  
2) The Undercount
The 1990 Census is widely viewed to have missed a substantial number of people. This 
problem is thought to be particularly severe in the case of poor and minority communities.  The 
undercount does not present a problem for our analysis per se, if all populations are mis-counted 
to the same degree in all years.  There may be a problem for our analysis of changes in 
                                               
20 Personal correspondence with Karen Humes, Special Populations Division, U.S. Census Bureau. 34
institutionalization between years, however, if the undercount changes across the years, or is 
different for different populations.  
Consider, for example, the change in the institutionalization rates of immigrants between 
1990 and 2000.  Table 2 shows that the fraction institutionalized for immigrants in 1990 was 
0.0107 and fell to 0.0068 in 2000.  Our interpretation is that immigrants were less likely to be 
institutionalized in 2000 than in 1990.  However, this change could happen mechanically if the 
undercount of minority communities was less severe in 2000 than in 1990.  Our interpretation of 
this decline in institutionalization as signaling something about the behavior of immigrants in the 
U.S. would be flawed, if the decline really occurs not because the numerator (the 
institutionalized population) changed, but because the denominator (the total population) 
changed due to better data collection methodology.
Robinson et al. (2002) uses demographic analysis methodology to estimate the 
undercount in 1990 and 2000. They estimate that the net undercount in 1990 was 1.65% and in 
2000 was a much smaller 0.12%.  We can use these estimates to do some “back of the envelope” 
calculations as to how the undercount of the immigrant population might affect our estimate of 
the fraction of immigrants who are institutionalized.  Appendix Table 1 shows how our estimate 
of the fraction of immigrants institutionalized would change under different assumptions about 
the undercount of immigrants in 1990 and 2000.35
Data Appendix Table 1: Estimates of How the 









These calculations are based on the numbers reported in Tables 1 and 2. For example, in 1990, 
there were 209,878 immigrants in our sample. The fraction institutionalized was 0.0107, 
implying 2245.7 institutionalized immigrants in 1990.  If we assume the undercount estimate 
applies to the non-institutionalized population, then we need to subtract the number of 
institutionalized immigrants from the full sample, multiply this number by the fraction “missing” 
and then add this number back onto the estimate of the total number of immigrants:
(209878-2245.7) * 0.0165 = 3425.9
Thus, the fraction institutionalized among the immigrants, assuming a 1.65% undercount would 
be:
2245.7 / (209878 + 3425.9) = 0.0105.
Using this formulation, we can examine what the effect on the estimate of the fraction of 
immigrants institutionalized would be given different assumptions about the severity of the 
undercount in the non-institutionalized immigrant population.36
Assuming that the undercount is three times larger for immigrants than for the overall 
population (e.g., there are three “missing” immigrants for every “missing” person overall), we 
would still find that the fraction institutionalized among immigrants was over 1.5 times higher in 
1990 than in 2000.  In order for the undercount to be the only reason that the fraction 
institutionalized among immigrants declined between 1990 and 2000, we would have to think 
that the undercount was about 37 times bigger for immigrants than for the population overall.  
In sum, neither the improvement in the undercount of the overall population between 
1990 and 2000, nor specialized undercount problems that pertain to the institutionalized 
population would be likely to mechanically generate our finding that there was a substantial 
decline in the fraction of immigrants institutionalized between 1990 and 2000.37
Table 1. Summary Statistics:
Characteristics of Immigrants and Natives in 1980, 1990 and 2000
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000

























































































































U.S. Citizen 1 0.3306





   Citizen: 96-00 0.0445
(0.0007)
   Citizen: 91-95 0.1392
(0.0012)






































No. Obs 1,900,112 127,392 1,984,069 209,878 1,875,961 352,534
Notes: These data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the U.S. 
Census. The data include men aged 18-40 inclusive. Those born in U.S. outlying areas, born abroad of American 
parents, or born at sea are excluded from the sample.  All means are weighted to reflect sampling.38
Table 2. Fraction of the Population Institutionalized  in 1980, 1990 and 2000
(Standard Errors in Parentheses; Sample Size in Square Brackets)













Native-Born Immigrants Native-Born Immigrants Native-Born Immigrants
















































































































   1996-2000 0.0037
(0.00020)
   1991-1995 0.0050
(0.00025)




































   1940-1949 0.0089  
(0.0018)
Notes: These data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) of the U.S. Census. The 
data include men aged 18-40 inclusive. All means are weighted to reflect sampling.Table 3a. Marginal Effects for Logit Estimates of Institutionalization – Evaluated at Sample Mean
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000
Immigrant -0.0090 -0.0110 -0.0276
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
1996-2000 -0.0254 -0.0166 -0.0142 -0.0146
(0.0002)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0002)
1991-1995 -0.0239 -0.0160 -0.0137 -0.0141
(0.0003)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0001)
1985-1990 -0.0144 -0.0112 -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.0219 -0.0155 -0.0134 -0.0138
(0.0004)(0.0002)(0.0002)(0.0002) (0.0003)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0002)
1980-1984 -0.0097 -0.0094 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0183 -0.0136 -0.0119 -0.0123
(0.0006)(0.0003)(0.0002)(0.0003) (0.0004)(0.0002)(0.0002)(0.0002)
1975-1979 -0.0100 -0.0073 -0.0066 -0.0061 -0.0091 -0.0090 -0.0079 -0.0079 -0.0189 -0.0131 -0.0115 -0.0118
(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0001)(0.0002) (0.0007)(0.0003)(0.0002)(0.0003) (0.0005)(0.0002)(0.0002)(0.0002)
1970-1974 -0.0090 -0.0070 -0.0064 -0.0059 -0.0076 -0.0081 -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0151 -0.0106 -0.0098 -0.0104
(0.0003)(0.0002)(0.0001)(0.0002) (0.0011)(0.0005)(0.0003)(0.0004) (0.0009)(0.0004)(0.0003)(0.0003)
1965-1969 -0.0084 -0.0065 -0.0058 -0.0054 -0.0043 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0180 -0.0111 -0.0100 -0.0104
(0.0004)(0.0002)(0.0002)(0.0003) (0.0014)(0.0008)(0.0006)(0.0006) (0.0011)(0.0007)(0.0005)(0.0004)
1960-1964 -0.0059 -0.0045 -0.0038 -0.0030 -0.0044 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0097 -0.0045 -0.0048 -0.0058
(0.0007)(0.0004)(0.0004)(0.0005) (0.0019)(0.0013)(0.0010)(0.0010) (0.0027)(0.0019)(0.0014)(0.0013)
1950-1959 -0.0060 -0.0038 -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0096 -0.0060 -0.0041 -0.0041
(0.0007)(0.0005)(0.0005)(0.0006) (0.0017)(0.0012)(0.0012)(0.0012)
1940-1950 -0.0015 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0007
(0.0021)(0.0015)(0.0015)(0.0016)
Less than H.S. 0.0735 0.0519 0.0519 0.1920 0.1153 0.1153 0.2468 0.1630 0.1621
(0.0017)(0.0013)(0.0013) (0.0054)(0.0038)(0.0038) (0.0046)(0.0035)(0.0035)
H.S. Degree 0.0150 0.0117 0.0117 0.0491 0.0315 0.0315 0.0689 0.0469 0.0466
(0.0004)(0.0004)(0.0004) (0.0014)(0.0010)(0.0010) (0.0014)(0.0010)(0.0010)
Some College 0.0110 0.0085 0.0085 0.0356 0.0243 0.0243 0.0349 0.0243 0.0242
(0.0005)(0.0005)(0.0005) (0.0013)(0.0010)(0.0010) (0.0011)(0.0008)(0.0008)40
1980 1991 2000
Black 0.0162 0.0162 0.0393 0.0393 0.0432 0.0430
(0.0003)(0.0003) (0.0007)(0.0007) (0.0006)(0.0006)
American Indian 0.0094 0.0094 0.0173 0.0173 0.0043 0.0043
(0.0008)(0.0008) (0.0013)(0.0013) (0.0006)(0.0006)
Asian or Pacific 0.0007 0.0006 0.0013 0.0013 0.0081 0.0083
(0.0007)(0.0007) (0.0009)(0.0009) (0.0008)(0.0008)
Other Race 0.0074 0.0074 0.0314 0.0314 -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.0012)(0.0012) (0.0071)(0.0071) (0.0003)(0.0003)
Hispanic 0.0027 0.0027 0.0119 0.0119 0.0165 0.0164
(0.0003)(0.0003) (0.0005)(0.0005) (0.0005)(0.0005)
U.S. Citizen 0.0025 0.0000 -0.0053
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Age Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Psuedo R-square 0.0085 0.0089 0.0838 0.1122 0.1122 0.0072 0.0077 0.0779 0.1379 0.1379 0.0213 0.0221 0.1166 0.1739 0.1739
Notes: The marginal effects are calculated at the sample means. Number of observations for 1980 is 2,027,504. Number of observations for 1990 is 2,193,947. Number of 
observations for 2000 is 2,228,495. All specifications include a full set of age dummies. Controls are: (1) age dummies; (2) age, education; (3) age, education, 
race/ethnicity; (4) age, race, ethnicity, education, and u.s. citizen. 
     41
Table 3b. Institutionalization and Immigrant Arrival Cohorts Compared to the Native-Born in 1980, 1990 and 2000
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1996-2000 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0035 0.0011 0.0008 0.0008
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
1991-1995 Cohort
Within Census
a 0.0056 0.0024 0.0018 0.0017
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
1985-1990 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0053 0.0022 0.0016 0.0016 0.0030 0.0024 0.0019 0.0019
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Between Census
 b -0.0074 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0043
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1980-1984 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0020 0.0013 0.0010 0.0010 0.0032 0.0030 0.0021 0.0020
(0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Between Census
 b -0.0086 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0041
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1975-1979 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0016 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0048 0.0041 0.0029 0.0030 0.0009 0.0020 0.0015 0.0014
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Between Census
 b 0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0098 -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0040
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
1970-1974 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0032 0.0025 0.0026 0.0029 0.0032 0.0050 0.0041 0.0041 0.0054 0.0061 0.0051 0.0045
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Between Census
 b 0.0014 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0014 -0.0075 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0031
(0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Notes: These numbers are calculated using the marginal effects calculated from logit estimates reported in Table 3a; column (1) here corresponds to the specification in column (2) 
in (2) in Table 3a etc. Standard errors are calculated as for the difference between two means.
     
aWithin Census differences are calculated by subtracting the given cohort’s probability from the probability for the cohort that arrived 10 years earlier.
     
aBetween Census differences are calculated by subtracting the probability for a given cohort in the two different Censuses (Probability in later census – probability in earlier 
census).42
Table 3c. Differences in Institutionalization Rates Across Immigrant Arrival Cohorts
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 versus 1990 1990 versus 2000
Years Since 
Arrival 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fewer than 5 -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0034 -0.0110 -0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0051
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0007 -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0142 -0.0067 -0.0054 -0.0058
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1980 versus 2000
Fewer than 5 -0.0154 -0.0093 -0.0076 -0.0085
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0148 -0.0090 -0.0074 -0.0082
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Notes: These numbers are calculated from Table 3a, subtracting the relative institutionalization rate for a cohort in 1980 (1990 respectively) 
from the relative institutionalization rate of the cohort in 1990 (2000 respectively) that had been in the U.S. for a comparable length of time. The 
bottom panel subtracts 1980 values from 2000 values. Column numbers refer to the specification from which the institutionalization rates were 
estimated, as in the previous two tables. See Table 3a for list of controls.  Standard errors are calculated as for difference between two means.  43
Table 4. Marginal Effects for Logit Estimates of Citizenship
Immigrants Only
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000
Raw 
Mean (1) (2) (3)
Raw
Mean (1) (2) (3)
Raw
Mean (1) (2) (3)
1996-2000 0.0445
(0.0007)
1991-1995 0.1392 0.2413 0.2433 0.2381
(0.0012) (0.0045)(0.0045)(0.0045)
1985-1990 0.0674  0.2991 0.4432 0.4559 0.4628
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0039)(0.0039)(0.0039)
1980-1984 0.2388 0.3079 0.3140 0.3140 0.4863 0.6222 0.6378 0.6433
(0.0018) (0.0043)(0.0043)(0.0044) (0.0022) (0.0035)(0.0035)(0.0035)
1975-1979 0.0730 0.3973 0.4876 0.4948 0.5012 0.5874 0.6868 0.6940 0.7017
(0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0042)(0.0042)(0.0043) (0.0031) (0.0030)(0.0030)(0.0030)
1970-1974 0.2604   0.3309 0.3398 0.3550 0.4771 0.5588 0.5679 0.5869 0.6671 0.7178 0.7179 0.7293
(0.0025) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0032) (0.0041)(0.0041)(0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0028)(0.0030)(0.0029)
1965-1969 0.4345   0.5059 0.5113 0.5270 0.5839   0.6287 0.6275 0.6475 0.7292 0.7312 0.7284 0.7408
(0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0037)(0.0038)(0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0029)(0.0032)(0.0031)
1960-1964 0.5875   0.6132 0.6116 0.6293 0.6809 0.6761 0.6699 0.6894 0.7667 0.7347 0.7308 0.7432
(0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0034)(0.0036)(0.0034) (0.0100) (0.0039)(0.0047)(0.0044)
1950-1959 0.7890  0.7212 0.7180 0.7223 0.7699 0.7070 0.7020 0.7139
(0.0034) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0057) (0.0031)(0.0033)(0.0032)
1940-1950 0.8965   0.7163 0.7174 0.7220
(0.0057) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025)
Psuedo R-
square 0.2444 0.2534 0.2615 0.1656 0.1849 0.1980 0.1911 0.2277 0.2455
Notes: The marginal effects are calculated at the sample means. The first column is just the raw fraction citizen for each Census year.  The second set of results 
is for a logit controlling for a full set of age dummies; the third set of results adds controls for education. The fourth set adds controls for race and ethnicity.  In 
all cases, the most recent arrival cohort is the excluded immigrant category. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means.  Number of observations 
for 1980 is 127,392. Number of observations for 1990 is 209,878. Number of observations for 2000 is 352,534.44
Table 5a. Institutionalization and Immigrant Arrival Cohorts Compared to the Native-Born in 1980, 1990 and 2000
Naturalized U.S. Citizens and Native-Born Only
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
1996-2000 Cohort
Within Census








 a 0.0011 0.0018 0.0015 0.0011 0.0011 0.0008
(0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Between Census




 a 0.0019 0.0019 0.0014 0.0014 0.0020 0.0013
(0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Between Census




 a -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.0046 0.0042 0.0029 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Between Census
 b -0.0055 -0.0030 -0.0022 -0.0137 -0.0072 -0.0060
(0.0016) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0005)
1970-1974 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0024 0.0028 0.0029 0.0021 0.0042 0.0036 0.0090 0.0086 0.0069
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0021)
Between Census
 b -0.0021 -0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0144 -0.0072 -0.0061
(0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0007)
Notes: These numbers are calculated using marginal effects calculated from logit estimates, not shown. Controls are: (1) age dummies; (2) age, education; (3) age, education, 
race/ethnicity; (4) age, race, ethnicity, education. Standard errors are calculated as for the difference between two means. The sample is limited to native-born and naturalized 
citizens.
aWithin Census differences are calculated by subtracting the given cohort’s probability from the probability for the cohort that arrived 10 years earlier.
aBetween Census differences are calculated by subtracting the probability for a given cohort in the two different Censuses (Probability in later census – probability in earlier 
census).45
Table 5b. Differences in Institutionalization Rates Across Immigrant Arrival Cohorts
Naturalized U.S. Citizens and Native-Born Only
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 versus 1990 1990 versus 2000
Years since 
Arrival 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Fewer than 5 -0.0066 -0.0048 -0.0037 -0.0124 -0.0059 -0.0049
(0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0004)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0040 -0.0034 -0.0027 -0.0163 -0.0082 -0.0065
(0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0004)
1980 versus 2000
Fewer than 5 -0.0190 -0.0107 -0.0085
(0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0203 -0.0116 -0.0092
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Notes: These numbers are calculated from marginal effects for logit estimates -- subtracting the relative institutionalization rate for 
a cohort in 1980 (1990 respectively) from the relative institutionalization rate of the cohort in 1990 (2000 respectively) that had 
been in the U.S. for a comparable length of time. The bottom panel subtracts 1980 values from 2000 values. Column numbers refer 
to the specification from which the institutionalization rates were estimated 46
Table 6a. Institutionalization and Immigrant Arrival Cohorts Compared to the Native-Born in 1980, 1990 and 2000
All Immigrants and Native-Born who have Moved across States
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1996-2000 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0036 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1991-1995 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0051 -0.0080 0.0020 0.0021
(0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
1985-1990 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0053 0.0022 0.0018 0.0018 0.0031 0.0025 0.0023 0.0024
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Between Census
 b -0.0030 -0.0013 -0.0015 -0.0019
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
1980-1984 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0018 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010 0.0028 0.0022 0.0018 0.0018
(0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0042) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Between Census
 b -0.0044 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0014
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1975-1979 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0017 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0046 0.0032 0.0025 0.0038 0.0009 0.0014 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Between Census
 b 0.0017 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0051 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
1970-1974 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0030 0.0021 0.0023 0.0025 0.0029 0.0036 0.0033 0.0024 0.0046 0.0038 0.0035 0.0031
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Between Census
 b 0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0034 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0007
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0042) (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0042)
Notes: These numbers are calculated using marginal effects calculated from logit estimates, not shown.  All specifications include a full set of age dummies. Controls are: (1) age dummies; (2) age, 
education; (3) age, education, race/ethnicity; (4) age, race, ethnicity, education, and U.S. citizen. Standard errors are calculated as for the difference between two means.
aWithin Census differences are calculated by subtracting the given cohort’s probability from the probability for the cohort that arrived 10 years earlier.
aBetween Census differences are calculated by subtracting the probability for a given cohort in the two different Censuses (Probability in later census – probability in earlier census).47
Table 6b. Differences in Institutionalization Rates Across Immigrant Arrival Cohorts
All Immigrants and Native-Born who have Moved across States
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 versus 1990 1990 versus 2000
Years since 
Arrival 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fewer than 5 -0.0036 -0.0032 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0065 -0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0029
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Between 5 and 10 0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0021 -0.0095 0.0069 -0.0031 -0.0034
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
1980 versus 2000
Fewer than 5 -0.0101 -0.0057 -0.0051 0.0043
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0094 0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0055
(0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Notes: These numbers are calculated from marginal effects for logit estimates -- subtracting the relative institutionalization rate for a cohort in 
1980 (1990 respectively) from the relative institutionalization rate of the cohort in 1990 (2000 respectively) that had been in the U.S. for a 
comparable length of time. The bottom panel subtracts 1980 values from 2000 values. Column numbers refer to the specification from which 
the institutionalization rates were estimated. See notes to Table 8a for list of controls.  Standard errors are calculated as for difference between 
two means.  48













































































































































































































Figure 5.  Institutionalization by Age
Native-born and Most Recent Immigrant Cohort





























































































Prediction based on age
Prediction based on age, race/ethnicity, and
education
 Notes: These numbers are calculated from logit regressions using the 5% Public Use Microdata Samples of the U.S. Census.  Predictions are created by running the logits for 
natives alone and predicting immigrant institutionalization rates using these coefficients and the characteristics of immigrants. Controls include a full set of age dummies and 
dichotomous variables for black, Asian, other race, Hispanic origin, high school dropout, high school degree, and some college.54
Figure 7. Changes in Metropolitan Area (MA) Crime Rates
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Appendix Table 1a. Institutionalization and Immigrant Arrival Cohorts Compared to the Native-Born in 1980, 1990 and 2000
Evaluated at a constant set of characteristics across Censuses
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1996-2000 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0041 0.0023 0.0023 0.0026
(0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0082)
1991-1995 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0070 0.0051 0.0052 0.0062
(0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0081)
1985-1990 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0063 0.0038 0.0040 0.0040 0.0030 0.0042 0.0045 0.0056
(2.0000) (3.0000) (4.0000) (5.0000) (0.0014) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0081)
Between Census
 b -0.0146 -0.0248 -0.0345 -0.0605
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0063)
1980-1984 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0025 0.0022 0.0025 0.0025 0.0044 0.0084 0.0087 0.0108
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0000 (0.0078)
Between Census
 b -0.0160 -0.0245 -0.0339 -0.0592
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0061)
1975-1979 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0018 0.0009 0.0010 0.0007 0.0061 0.0080 0.0085 0.0085 0.0011 0.0060 0.0068 0.0089
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0007) 0.0012 (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0080)
Between Census
 b 0.0012 -0.0069 -0.0121 -0.0162 -0.0179 -0.0245 -0.0340 -0.0589
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0061)
1970-1974 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0040 0.0037 0.0043 0.0033 0.0041 0.0101 0.0124 0.0123 0.0085 0.0201 0.0258 0.0327
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0009) 0.0012 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0110)
Between Census
 b 0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0108 -0.0149 -0.0140 -0.0183 -0.0276 -0.0509
(0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0059)
Notes: These numbers are calculated using marginal effects calculated from logit estimates, not shown.  Here, we evaluate the marginal effects at the same values across all censuses:  25 year old 
Hispanics with a high school degree.  All specifications include a full set of age dummies. Controls are: (1) age dummies; (2) age, education; (3) age, education, race/ethnicity; (4) age, race, ethnicity, 
education, and u.s. citizen. Standard errors are calculated as for the difference between two means.
aWithin Census differences are calculated by subtracting the given cohort’s probability from the probability for the cohort that arrived 10 years earlier.
aBetween Census differences are calculated by subtracting the probability for a given cohort in the two different Censuses (Probability in later census – probability in earlier census).56
Appendix Table 1b. Differences in Institutionalization Rates Across Immigrant Arrival Cohorts
Evaluated at a constant set of characteristics across Censuses
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 versus 1990 1990 versus 2000
Years since 
Arrival 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fewer than 5 -0.0051 -0.0107 -0.0161 -0.0202 -0.0188 -0.0271 -0.0368 -0.0632
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0064)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0006 -0.0078 -0.0133 -0.0173 -0.0230 -0.0296 -0.0392 -0.0655
(0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0063)
1980 versus 2000
Fewer than 5 -0.0239 -0.0378 -0.0528 -0.0834
(0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0059)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0236 -0.0374 -0.0524 -0.0828
(0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0059)
Notes: These numbers are calculated from marginal effects for logit estimates -- subtracting the relative institutionalization rate for a cohort in 
1980 (1990 respectively) from the relative institutionalization rate of the cohort in 1990 (2000 respectively) that had been in the U.S. for a 
comparable length of time. The bottom panel subtracts 1980 values from 2000 values. Column numbers refer to the specification from which 
the institutionalization rates were estimated. See notes to Table 4a for list of controls.  Marginal effects were calculated for 25 year old 
Hispanics with a high school degree.  Standard errors are calculated as for difference between two means.  57
Appendix Table 2a. Institutionalization and Immigrant Arrival Cohorts Compared to the Native-Born in 1980, 1990 and 2000
Immigrants who Arrived as Children and Native-Born
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
1996-2000 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0032 0.0011 0.0008 0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
1991-1995 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0041 0.0017 0.0013 0.0014
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
1985-1990 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0002 0.0015 0.0011 0.0011 0.0030 0.0017 0.0015 0.0016
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Between Census
 b -0.0124 -0.0048 -0.0042 -0.0041
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0003)
1980-1984 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0021 0.0016 0.0012 0.0011
(0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Between Census
 b -0.0085 -0.0051 -0.0042 -0.0040
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1975-1979 Cohort
Within  Census
 a 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0060 0.0023 0.0016 0.0015 0.0198 0.0143 0.0122 0.0125
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Between Census
 b -0.0002 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0026 -0.0096 -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0037
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
1970-1974 Cohort
Within Census
 a 0.0010 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0103 0.0101 0.0087 0.0090 0.0184 0.0131 0.0115 0.0119
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Between Census
 b -0.0008 -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0080 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Notes: These numbers are calculated using marginal effects calculated from logit estimates, not shown.  All specifications include a full set of age dummies. Controls are: (1) age dummies; (2) age, 
education; (3) age, education, race/ethnicity; (4) age, race, ethnicity, education, and u.s. citizen. Standard errors are calculated as for the difference between two means.
aWithin Census differences are calculated by subtracting the given cohort’s probability from the probability for the cohort that arrived 10 years earlier.
aBetween Census differences are calculated by subtracting the probability for a given cohort in the two different Censuses (Probability in later census – probability in earlier census).58
Appendix Table 2b. Differences in Institutionalization Rates Across Immigrant Arrival Cohorts
Immigrants who Arrived as Children and Native-Born
 (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1980 versus 1990 1990 versus 2000
Years since 
Arrival 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Fewer than 5 -0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0156 -0.0058 -0.0050 -0.0050
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0016) (0.0003)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0020 -0.0027 -0.0126 -0.0068 -0.0055 -0.0054
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
1980 versus 2000
Fewer than 5 -0.0160 -0.0097 -0.0079 -0.0087
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Between 5 and 10 -0.0151 -0.0093 -0.0075 -0.0081
(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Notes: These numbers are calculated from marginal effects for logit estimates -- subtracting the relative institutionalization rate for a cohort in 
1980 (1990 respectively) from the relative institutionalization rate of the cohort in 1990 (2000 respectively) that had been in the U.S. for a 
comparable length of time. The bottom panel subtracts 1980 values from 2000 values. Column numbers refer to the specification from which 
the institutionalization rates were estimated. See notes to Table 7a for list of controls.  Standard errors are calculated as for difference between 
two means.  1 
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